Important Note on Scope

This explainer applies only to Afghan nationals in Pakistan.

Afghans in other countries have faced different legal regimes, processing environments, and risks. While U.S. policy decisions affected Afghans globally, Pakistan represents a uniquely acute case due to its proximity to Afghanistan, the size of the Afghan population present there, and the interaction between U.S. immigration policy and Pakistani enforcement decisions.

This explainer focuses on how U.S. and Pakistani policies intersected in Pakistan, and why Afghan allies there are now facing extreme danger.

Who This Explainer Centers

Pakistan has hosted multiple categories of Afghans with U.S. ties, including:

• Refugees referred to the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), commonly known as P1 and P2 cases,

• Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants who had not yet reached the interview stage,

• Afghans who applied for humanitarian parole but whose applications were never adjudicated, and

• Other Afghans with U.S.-linked immigration or family-based cases.

All of these groups have been affected by shifting policies.

However, this explainer centers three populations that were impacted most acutely in Pakistan:

1. USRAP P1/P2 refugees,

2. SIV applicants awaiting interview, and

3. Humanitarian parole applicants whose cases stalled without adjudication.

These individuals share key vulnerabilities:

• They often lacked durable legal status in Pakistan.

• They could not safely return to Afghanistan.

• They were dependent on U.S. processing timelines beyond their control.

• Their protection in Pakistan rested largely on informal tolerance rather than law.

August 2021: Evacuation Chaos and the Third-Country Requirement

Following the collapse of the Afghan government and the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, tens of thousands of Afghan allies were left behind.

In the immediate aftermath, the U.S. government consistently told Afghans with refugee referrals that it could not assist them unless they were physically present in a third country. Refugee processing inside Afghanistan was not operational, and the Taliban was not recognized as a legitimate government with which the United States could coordinate.

For many Afghans facing retaliation, the message was clear:

“If you want U.S. help, you must leave Afghanistan on your own.”

2021–2022: Refugees Self-Relocate to Pakistan

Pakistan became the primary destination for Afghan refugees because:

• It was geographically accessible.

• It allowed entry, often temporarily.

• Other countries imposed stricter entry requirements.

By late 2021 and throughout 2022, tens of thousands of Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan while awaiting U.S. processing.

Most:

• Had short-term visas or no durable legal status.

• Were forced to renew visas repeatedly or live in legal limbo.

• Relied on Pakistani tolerance rather than formal protection.

Advocates warned early that this arrangement was fragile and unsustainable.

October 2022: Enduring Welcome Changes U.S. Policy

On October 1, 2022, the U.S. government launched Enduring Welcome, replacing Operation Allies Welcome.

Enduring Welcome marked a significant shift:

• The United States allowed P1 and P2 refugees inside Afghanistan to access relocation support.

• This was possible because the Taliban was not recognized as a legitimate government.

• In theory, refugees no longer needed to flee to a third country to remain eligible.

But for Pakistan, the impact was limited.

By this point:

• Tens of thousands of refugees were already in Pakistan.

• Many could not safely return to Afghanistan.

• Pakistan continued to host a large population with no clear timeline for departure.

Enduring Welcome changed U.S. policy.
It did not undo the reality created in Pakistan.

2022–2023: Delays, Enforcement Pressure, and Rising Risk

Throughout 2022 and into 2023:

• Refugee processing remained slow.

• Visa renewals and exit permits became harder to obtain.

• Pakistan increased enforcement pressure in waves.

Refugees faced a paradox:

• They were told to wait for U.S. processing.

• They were penalized for waiting.

This tension led directly to intensified diplomatic engagement.

Fall 2023: Escalation Within Ongoing U.S.–Pakistan Diplomacy

By the fall of 2023, the United States and Pakistan had already been engaged in long, protracted discussions regarding Afghan nationals in Pakistan who were awaiting U.S. immigration processing.

These discussions involved:

• Senior U.S. embassy leadership,

• Multiple U.S. government agencies,

• Pakistani government counterparts.

The core challenge was widely understood:

• Pakistan was hosting a very large population of Afghans who were not moving quickly enough.

• The United States had not yet put in place a durable processing and protection framework capable of withstanding prolonged delays.

As enforcement pressure increased and risks to Afghan populations became more acute, concerns were escalated within this existing diplomatic channel.

In October 2023:

• AfghanEvac sent a formal letter to senior Pakistani officials urging restraint toward Afghans in U.S. immigration pathways.

• The letter called for exemptions from detention and deportation for this defined population.

• It was signed by a bipartisan group of former U.S. ambassadors, retired generals, and humanitarian leaders.

Around the same time:

• Members of Congress, including Representative William Keating, sent correspondence to Pakistani officials.

• These letters urged the opening of a Resettlement Support Center and renewed restraint toward Afghan refugees and other U.S.-linked populations.

• Additional private correspondence from senators and congressional offices reinforced the same message.

These letters:

• Did not initiate U.S.–Pakistan engagement.

• Amplified existing diplomacy.

• Elevated the humanitarian and diplomatic stakes.

• Made clear that the status quo was untenable.

This escalation helped sharpen existing diplomacy and set the stage for the high-level engagement that followed in November 2023.

What changed in fall 2023
The critical shift was not only diplomatic. It was operational.

A central demand, echoed by AfghanEvac’s letter and by congressional correspondence, was the opening of a Resettlement Support Center (RSC) capability in Pakistan so refugee processing could move at real scale, and so Pakistani enforcement pressure would not collapse the pipeline.

In practice, expanded RSC capacity and an increased PRM and USCIS footprint were the mechanism that made the broader understanding workable: Pakistan could point to visible processing progress, and the United States could credibly commit to moving a defined population through the system rather than leaving them in indefinite limbo.

November 2023: A Fragile Breakthrough with Pakistan

During the fall of 2023, after sustained high-level engagement, the United States and Pakistan reached a practical understanding.

This period included:

• Senior State Department visits to Pakistan.

• Ambassador-level engagement with Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

• Parallel congressional and diplomatic pressure.

• Coordinated interagency focus on Pakistan.

The message was unmistakable: this was a defined, documented population for which the United States accepted responsibility.

The list included:

• USRAP P1/P2 refugees,

• SIV applicants,

• Humanitarian parole seekers.

The list was shown, not left behind.

The Commitments Made

Two reciprocal commitments were reached.

The U.S. commitment
The United States committed to processing all Afghans in U.S. immigration pathways in Pakistan. Processing was real and ongoing, supported by staffing plans tied to expanded processing capacity, including the RSC mechanism that enabled scale. Embassy letters were issued to every individual on the list.

The Pakistani commitment
Pakistan committed to not harassing that defined population while U.S. processing moved forward.

For a time, the arrangement worked:

• Arrests declined.

• Deportations slowed.

• Embassy letters were honored.

2024: A Fragile Equilibrium

Throughout 2024:

• U.S. processing continued.

• Pakistan largely honored its commitment to restraint.

• Afghan allies remained in Pakistan in reliance on the understanding reached the year before.

The system was imperfect, but it functioned.

2023–2024: CARE Relocations, U.S.-Sustained Housing, and Reliance in Pakistan

As part of the U.S. government’s Afghan relocation efforts, the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE) moved Afghans overland from Afghanistan into Pakistan, including refugees, SIV applicants awaiting interview, and others with pending U.S. immigration pathways.

These individuals were placed into U.S.-government-sustained housing while their cases were processed. For many, this housing represented a transition point, not a destination.

People brought into CARE housing were led to believe they would be moving onward to the United States once processing was complete. In reliance on that understanding, many sold their remaining belongings in Afghanistan, exhausted personal savings, and severed what little stability they had left.

This relocation and housing support:

• Saved lives.

• Enabled processing to continue.

• And critically, created deep reliance on U.S. follow-through.

Once moved into U.S.-sustained housing in Pakistan, most individuals:

• Could not safely return to Afghanistan.

• No longer had homes, livelihoods, or assets to return to.

• Had no independent means to remain lawfully in Pakistan.

In November 2024, CARE began removing some Afghans from housing in Pakistan whose cases were considered stalled or no longer eligible for sustainment support. CARE made clear that these determinations were not immigration or visa eligibility decisions, but rather sustainment determinations related to housing authority.

Advocates raised immediate concerns about the timing and consequences of these removals, particularly because:

• These individuals had been moved into housing by the U.S. government itself.

• Many had been waiting for extended periods.

• Several individuals later received Chief of Mission approval or authorization to move onward, demonstrating that stalled cases were not necessarily ineligible cases.

These housing removals did not cause the later collapse of the U.S.–Pakistan arrangement. But they increased vulnerability for a subset of Afghans in Pakistan just months before U.S. processing was halted entirely.

January 2025: Processing Stops and the Arrangement Collapses

In January 2025, the Trump administration halted refugee processing.

That decision:

• Ended U.S. refugee processing in Pakistan.

• Broke the U.S. commitment underpinning the fall 2023 arrangement.

• Removed the incentive for Pakistani restraint.

Pakistan resumed harassment, detention, and deportation of U.S.-linked Afghans almost immediately.

Islamabad as the Default Post After January 2025

After January 2025, the U.S. government also made a separate, consequential decision.

Because there are no U.S. consular services in Afghanistan, the State Department declared Islamabad to be the primary processing post for Afghan nationals.

This designation:

• Was made without prior coordination with Pakistan.

• Applied to most Afghan visa categories, including family-based and other immigrant and non-immigrant visas.

• Did not apply to Afghan SIVs, which follow a separate statutory and operational framework.

• Further concentrated Afghan demand on Islamabad at a moment when processing capacity was shrinking, not expanding.

For many Afghans in Pakistan, this meant:

• Being required to remain in Pakistan to pursue a visa.

• Being exposed to enforcement while waiting.

• Having no alternative post available.

This decision compounded risk at precisely the wrong moment.

Why This Was Foreseeable, and Why It Is Still Wrong

Advocates warned for years that:

• Temporary protections could not last indefinitely.

• Delays would increase risk.

• Refugees would pay the price.

Those warnings proved correct.

But foreseeable harm does not become acceptable harm.

The Afghans most affected:

• Followed U.S. guidance as it evolved.

• Waited in good faith.

• Had no control over the January 2025 policy decisions.

• Were already documented, listed, and known to both governments.

They are now being punished for circumstances entirely outside their control.

Where Things Stand Now

Today, tens of thousands of Afghan allies in Pakistan face renewed danger.

This is not the result of confusion or misunderstanding. 

It is the downstream consequence of policy decisions.

And it is still wrong.

What AfghanEvac Is Calling For

AfghanEvac calls for:

• An immediate halt to arrests, detention, and deportations of Afghans documented as being in U.S. immigration pathways.

• Recognition of U.S. Embassy letters or equivalent documentation as a basis for temporary protection.

• Time and space for diplomatic engagement and lawful processing to resume

Lives depend on it.